

## ETHICS TUTORIALS

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Please email your essay to me and your tutorial partner **24 hours in advance of your tutorial**.

I will read and comment on your essays, and please read your tutorial partner's essays before the tutorial. If you don't send your essay by 24 hours in advance, you'll need to read your essay out at the beginning of the tutorial (this is not a punishment; it's just the tutorial group needs to know the content of your essay for the discussion).

You should also come to the tutorial with **at least one question about your tutorial partner's essay**. That could be, among other things, a request for clarification on a key issue, or a possible counterargument or counterexample, or a suggested fix or modification for an argument. You should also feel free come to the tutorial with questions to ask which you might not have covered in your essay.

One of the key things you'll have been doing in your philosophy tutorials so far, and which you'll continue to do in these tutorials, is learning how to write a philosophy essay. If you're interested, I've written a set of writing tips (aimed at 1<sup>st</sup> years taking General Philosophy tutorials), which you can find [here](#).

### Questions and Readings

B=Background Reading    E=Essential Reading    F=Further Reading

#### Section One: Ethical Theories

##### Week 1. Consequentialism and Friendship

*Question:* Can a good consequentialist be a good friend?

- B. Krister Bykvist. 2010. [Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed](#) (Continuum): 16-22; 106-10.
- E. Peter Railton. 1984. "[Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality](#)." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 13 (2): 134-171.
- E. Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley. 1995. "[Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation](#)." *Ethics* 106 (1): 86-111.
- F. Elinor Mason. 1998. "[Can an Indirect Consequentialist Be a Real Friend?](#)" *Ethics* 108 (2): 386-393.
- F. Michael Stocker. 1976. "[The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories](#)." *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (14): 453-466.

##### Week 2. Kantianism and The Formula of the Universal Law

*Question:* What does Kant mean when he says 'act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law'? Does this provide a good to action?

- B. Andrews Reath. 1993. "[Categorical Imperative](#)." In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell).
- E. Immanuel Kant. 1785. [Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals](#). Translated and edited by Mary Gregor (CUP, 1998): secs. I-II.

- E. Christine Korsgaard. 1985. "Kant's Formula of Universal Law." In [Creating the Kingdom of Ends](#) (CUP, 1996): 77-105.
- F. Allen Wood. 1999. [Kant's Ethical Thought](#) (CUP): chapter 3.
- F. Onora O'Neill. 1985. "[Consistency in Action](#)." In *Constructions of Reason* (CUP, 1989): 81-104.

### Week 3. Virtue Ethics

*Question:* Can virtue ethics provide a credible criterion of right action? Should it?

- B. Roger Crisp. 1998. "[Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues](#)." Introduction to his (ed.) *How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues* (OUP): 1-18.
- E. Aristotle. [Nicomachean Ethics](#), translated and edited by Roger Crisp (CUP, 2000): bk. 2, chs. 1-9; bk. 6, chs. 1-7, 12-13.
- E. G. E. M. Anscombe. "[Modern Moral Philosophy](#)." *Philosophy* 33 (124): 1-19.
- E. Rosalind Hursthouse. 1998. "[Normative Virtue Ethics](#)." In Roger Crisp (ed.) *How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues* (OUP): 19-36.
- F. Julia Driver. 2006. "Virtue Theory." In James Dreier (ed.) [Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory](#) (Blackwell): 113-123.

## Section Two: Metaethics

### Week 4. Practical Reason: Internalism and Externalism about Reasons

*Question:* Can one have a reason to do something even if one could not be motivated to do it?

- B. Steven Arkonovich. 2013. "[Reasons, Internal and External](#)." In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell).
- E. David Hume. 1739/40. [A Treatise of Human Nature](#). Edited by L. A. Selby Briggie and revised by P.H. Niddich (OUP): bk. 2, pt. 3, sect. 3; bk. 3, pt. 1.
- E. Bernard Williams. 1980. "Internal and External Reasons." In [Moral Luck](#) (CUP, 1981): 101-113.
- F. Brad Hooker. 1987. "[Williams' Argument against External Reasons](#)." *Analysis* 47 (1): 42-44.
- F. Christine Korsgaard. 1986. "Scepticism about Practical Reason." In [Creating the Kingdom of Ends](#) (CUP, 1996): 311-34.
- F. Bernard Williams. 1989. "[Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame](#)." In *Making sense of Humanity* (CUP, 1995): 35-45.

### Week 5. Moral Realism: Evolutionary Challenges

*Question:* Should the fact that we evolved make us doubt that things really are good or bad?

- B. Jonas Olson. 2013. "[Metaethics](#)." In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell): esp. 5-9.
- E. Sharon Street. 2006. "[A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value](#)." *Philosophical Studies* 127 (1): 109-166.

*And at least one of the following three responses to Street:*

- F. David Copp. 2008. "[Darwinian Scepticism about Moral Realism](#)." *Philosophical Issues* 18 (1): 186-206.

- F. David Enoch. 2010. "[The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it.](#)" *Philosophical Studies* 148 (3): 413-438
- F. Louise Hanson. 2017. "[The Real Problem with Evolutionary Debunking Arguments](#)" *The Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (268): 508-33.

## Week 6. Moral Non-Cognitivism: Semantic Challenges

*Question:* "[I]f I utter with full conviction the sentence, 'If gambling is bad, inviting people to gamble is bad', I do not thereby condemn either gambling or invitations to gamble" (Geach, "Ascriptivism"). Is this claim consistent with moral non-cognitivism?

- B. Jonas Olson. 2013. "[Metaethics.](#)" In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell): esp. 2-5.
- E. A. J. Ayer. 1946. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Dover): ch. 6 (pp. 102-12 only)
- E. Peter Geach. 1965. "[Assertion.](#)" *The Philosophical Review* 74 (4): 449-465.
- E. Simon Blackburn. 1984. *Spreading the Word* (OUP): ch. 6, esp. sec 2.
- F. Mark Schroeder. 2008. "[What is the Frege-Geach Problem?](#)" *Philosophy Compass* 3 (4): 703–720.

## Section Three: Practical Ethics

### Week 7. Abortion

*Question:* Is abortion morally permissible? Is this question settled by the question of whether a foetus is a person?

- B. Susan Dwyer. 2013. "[Abortion.](#)" In Hugh LaFollette (ed.) *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Wiley-Blackwell):
- E. Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1971. "[A Defense of Abortion.](#)" *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1 (1): 47-66.
- E. Mary Anne Warren 1973. "[On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.](#)" *The Monist* 57 (1): 43–61.
- F. Don Marquis. 1989. "[Why Abortion is Immoral.](#)" *The Journal of Philosophy* 86 (4): 183-202.
- F. Ann E. Cudd. 1990. "[Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's 'Why Abortion is Immoral.'](#)" *The Journal of Philosophy* 87 (5): 262-264.

### Week 8. Animal Ethics

*Question:* Is there a plausible explanation of why it's impermissible to eat humans which wouldn't also mean that it's impermissible to eat animals?

- B. Lori Gruen. "[The Moral Status of Animals.](#)" *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: section 1.
- E. Peter Singer. 1975. *Animal Liberation* (Pimlico): ch. 1.
- E. Cora Diamond. 1978. "[Eating Meat and Eating People.](#)" *Philosophy* 53 (206): 465-479.
- F. Shelly Kagan. 2016. "[What's Wrong with Speciesism?](#)" *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 33 (1): 1-21.
- F. Jeff McMahan. 2008. "[Eating Animals the Nice Way.](#)" *Daedalus* 137 (1): 66-76.