Photo by Lucy Campbell

I am a philosopher. I work on the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and moral psychology.

I am currently a research associate and project administrator on the New Directions in the Study of the Mind project, based in in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. I am also Director of Studies in Philosophy at Magdalene College, Cambridge.

I recently completed my PhD (also at Cambridge). Before that, I completed an MPhil in Philosophy at Cambridge, and a BA in Philosophy and Ancient Greek at University College London.

My research centres on psychological, epistemological, and normative questions about the attitudes, the various ways we can think and feel about things. These questions include:

  • What distinguishes different attitudes from one another? What distinguishes believing, for example, from other attitudes like imagining, hoping, or intending?
  • How is belief related to other attitudes? Does fearing something involve believing that it's dangerous? Does intending to do something involve believing that one will do it?
  • What makes a belief justified, rational, or knowledge?
  • What kind of norms govern that govern the attitudes? How are they different from (or similar to) practical and moral norms governing action?

My PhD thesis was on epistemic normativity. In particular, it argued that belief is subject to a truth norm that prescribes that one ought to believe something if and only if it's true. I argue for this on the grounds that belief being subject to such a norm can give a unifying explanation of epistemic justification. My supervisors were Tim Crane and Arif Ahmed.

Currently, I am working on related issues in philosophy of action and moral psychology, including:

  • Thinking about what kind of norms there are on speech acts like assertion.
  • Investigating how to unify the varieties of responsibility we have for our actions and attitudes. In doing this, I've recently become interested how lawyers and legal theorists think about the legal categories of mens rea (intention, foreknowledge, recklessness, negligence).

When I have the time, I like to garden. I used to work as a gardener here, and I'm keen on growing vegetables using the no-dig method. If you want to know about no-dig gardening, you should read this wonderful book, (or this one for advice more appropriate to the British climate).