I am a philosophy researcher. I work on the intersection of philosophy of mind, epistemology, and legal philosophy.
I'm currently a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Philosophy Department at University College London. I've previously held positions in Southampton, Birkbeck, Oxford, Cambridge, and Gothenburg.
My research centres on psychological, epistemological, and normative questions about belief, such as:
- What it is to believe something rather merely suspect or hope that it is the case?
- What general principles are there that tell us what we should believe?
- In what sense can we be held responsible for what we believe?
- How does what we believe about what we're doing determine what we are responsible for?
My work on belief started with my PhD, which I studied for at the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Tim Crane and Arif Ahmed. In my PhD thesis, and in subsequent papers, I argued that belief is subject to a truth norm that prescribes that one ought to believe something if and only if it's true. It argued for this on the grounds that belief being subject to such a norm can give a unifying explanation of epistemic justification.
More recently, I have been looking at how similar questions about belief arise in the context of the criminal law. This is the topic of my Leverhulme Trust-funded project, Belief in Philosophy and the Criminal Law. The project will focus on the role of the concept of belief in understanding criminal responsibility. It will look at how a defendant's beliefs, and their failure to have the correct beliefs, can determine whether they are guilty of a crime. It will investigate both how the role of belief in the criminal law can inform our philosophical accounts of belief, and how philosophical work on belief can help us better understand the criminal law. (You can see my first attempt to draw parallels between epistemology and the philosophy of criminal law in this paper).
I also have a side-interest in the history of philosophy, in particular Aristotle's philosophy of mind. (This is a paper I wrote on this topic while I was a visitor to the Representation and Reality project in Gothenburg).